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Almost 20 years have passed since a perceived rise in medical malpractice
pushed the healthcare industries into crisis.' During the early 1970s, the medical
insurance community, healthcare providers, and the general public, concluded that
the number of medical malpractice lawsuits - and the resulting judgment awards
- were rising at an alarming rate.2 Some portions of the healthcare community
saw these increases as a threat to the strength and quality of medical care in the
United States.3
Healthcare providers, lawyers, insurance companies, and state legislatures
all reacted to the crisis in their own way. The healthcare providers became more
defensive in their approach to patient care.4 Lawyers used new strategies in both
the prosecution and defense of medical malpractice. The courts accepted many
of these new theories of liability and defense.5 Insurance companies either
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); see also Gross v. James A.
Recdabaren, M.D., Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1988).
2. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severiy of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 57-58.
3. See Nicholas P. Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 571, 575-77 (1986). There is some debate within the legal
community regarding the validity of the crisis of the mid-1970s as well as the second crisis of the
early 1980s. Id. at 575-80.
4. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-LawDogma: Market Opportunities
and Legal Obstacles, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143. Diagnostic tests were
performed when earlier they had seemed unnecessary, too troublesome, or too costly. Id. at 159.
5. These judicial changes were many and varied. They included changes in the standard of care
to rules involving expert witnesses and the defenses of informed consent. See generally STEVEN F.
PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHMAN, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1-64 (1981); 70
C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 70, 92, 122 (1987). Although the area of medical malpractice
legal evolution is interesting, the scope of this Comment will be limited to the acceptance, advantages,
and disadvantages of arbitration in this area.
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dropped out of insuring doctors and hospitals altogether or increased their rates
dramatically.6 Influenced by this, state legislatures began to enact numerous
types of medical malpractice tort reforms.7  The Missouri legislature, for
example, has enacted five statutes designed to counter the medical malpractice
crisis.8 The various reforms enacted by state legislatures included changes in the
substantive law, such as lowering the standard of care required.9  More
commonly, legislatures changed procedural, filing, and evidentiary rules (i.e.,
shortening the statute of limitations or requiring a malpractice certification
affidavit of a healthcare provider).' 0
In addition to the legislative reactionary reforms, the hospitals, the doctors,
and the new breed of healthcare providers, group health plans such as health
maintenance organizations (HMOs)," began to install their own tailor-made tort
reforms by entering private contracts with their patients." Many of these
medical service contracts included a clause mandating binding arbitration as an
alternative forum for dispute resolution."3
Although there is minimal empirical data to support many of the
conclusions, 4 the purported advantages and disadvantages of using private tort
reform such as contractual arbitration are popular subjects of debate." This
6. See David S. Starr, The No-Fault Alternative to Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Compensation, Deterrence, and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme, 20 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 803, 804 (1989).
7. Lauren K. Saunders, Legislative Research Bureau Report, The Quest for Balance: Public
Policy and Due Proces in Medical Malpractice Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARV. J. ON LEOIS. 267,
268 (1986).
8. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.225 (Supp. 1991) (expert opinion affidavit requirement); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 538.230 (Supp. 1991) (special rule for joint liability for malpractice defendants); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 538.210 (Supp. 1991) ($350,000 cap for non-economic damages); Mo. REV. STAT. §
538.210(5) (Supp. 1991) (substantive rule for punitive damages); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.220(2)
(Supp. 1991) (periodic payment option).
9. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.225 (requiring plaintiffs affidavit to state that health care
provider failed to use reasonable care).
10. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.225(4); see also Terry, supra note 3, at 577-79.
11. Health maintenance organizations are groups of participating healthcare providers that provide
medical service to enrolled members of group health insurance plans. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
721 (6th ed. 1990).
12. William H. Ginsburg et al., Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, 49 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253, 255-57. The private reforms found in these medical
service contracts often include agreements to accept periodic payments, to accept a pre-set limit on
damages if a lawsuit results, or to agree not to invoke the collateral source rule. Id. at 258-64.
13. See Terry, supra note 3, at 585-88. The decision to include such an arbitration agreement
in a contract for medical services is traditionally voluntary on the part of both the provider and the
patient. Id. at 585. However, Michigan has gone so far as to enact laws requiring that all hospitals
include a contractual clause to arbitrate in their admissions documents which patients can either accept
or reject. See MICH. CoMrP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West 1987).
14. Duane H. Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is It Cost Effective?, 36 MD.
L. REv. 533, 536-37 (1977).
15. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 161-62.
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Comment will examine both the acceptance of and the use of private contract,
arbitration clauses in the medical malpractice legal arena.
II. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. The Private Contract Arbitration Agreement
Private contractual agreements establish arbitration as an alternative forum
to the court system for the individual providers and their patients.' 6 As with any
contract, the parties voluntarily enter into the agreement; if the contract is legally
valid, the parties must submit their dispute to an arbitrator, whose decision is
final and binding on the parties. 7
For several years, labor and commercial transaction contracts have used
private arbitration agreements in order to select a forum."5 A certain body of
law developed out of the litigation resulting from such use of arbitration
clauses.' 9 This resultant body of law established a precedent for the use of
arbitration clauses in all private contracts, including medical service contractsY°
The philosophy behind the use of arbitration clauses is to provide a
substituted forum which is less troublesome, less expensive, less time consuming,
and less public for the participants. 2' Many commentators view arbitration as
a process that is more understandable to the participants and better tailored to the
dispute at hand than a traditional courtroom forum.22 Furthermore, the
arbitration forum is highly flexible;23 the procedures used can be manipulated by
the wishes of the parties involved,' and the traditional rules of evidence or
discovery may-be employed if desired.25 On the other hand, the parties may
wish to dispense with these formalities to simplify the process.26
The contract agreement can specify who chooses the arbitrator;27 the
decision can rest with the parties themselves or with objective groups such as the
American Arbitration Association." In addition, the parties can stipulate the
16. James A. Henderson, Jr., Agreements Changing the ForumforResolving Malpractice Claims,
49 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Spring 1986, at 243, 243.
17. PEGALIS & WACHMAN, supra note 5, at 14-15.
18. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985).
19. See id. at 23-50.
20. See id. at 29-32.
21. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 297
(1986).
22. Id. at 297-98.
23. Id. at 250; Havighurst, supra note 4, at 161.
24. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 250; Havighurst, supra note 4, at 161.
25. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 276.
26. Id. at 276, 297.
27. Id. at 298.
28. Id. at 253.
19921
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qualifications which the arbitrator must exhibit. 29  Finally, the agreement can
vest the dispute decision-making power with an individual arbitrator or a panel of
three or more arbitrators.3 0
B. State Regulation of Arbitration Agreements
A variety of state statutes regulate the use of arbitration agreements. The
Uniform Arbitration Act3 has been adopted by a majority of states.32  The
U.A.A. regulates all arbitration agreements in private contracts whether or not
they encompass medical services; 33 some statutes even prohibit agreements to
arbitrate future tort disputes.' In addition, some state legislatures have enacted
statutes specifically regulating the use of arbitration agreements in medical service
35contacts. These statutes often try to provide some degree of protection to the
patient; such protection may be via requiring the type displaying the arbitration
clause in the contract to be a larger size than the rest of the contract or requiring
the subject clause to be printed in a different color.36 These statutes often
require either the inclusion of a statement advising the patient that signing the
arbitration clause is voluntary or inclusion of a statement explaining that receipt
of treatment is not contingent on signing such an agreement.37 Still others
require notice to the patient that signing such an agreement will be a waiver of
the patient's constitutional right to sue.38 Additionally, some statutes require a
provision that the agreement to arbitrate be rescindable by the patient within a
certain period of time.39
The Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act" is an example of a
statute that sets out specific conditions for the arbitration agreement to be
enforceable. 4 Under this statute, all hospitals are required to include a binding
29. For example, some state statutes that regulate arbitration clauses in medical service contracts
may require that one or more of the arbitrators have a medical background. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.5044.
30. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 272.
31. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1985) [hereinafter U.A.A.1.
32. See Recent Developments: The Uniform ArbitrationAct, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 411,411 n.3.
In addition, numerous states have enacted arbitration statutes directed at the use of arbitration clauses
as a medical malpractice alternative. See Terry, supra note 3, at 587.
33. See U.A.A. § 1.
34. See Terry, supra note 3, at 587-88.
35. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065; P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 4109
(Supp. 1989); see also Saunders, supra note 7, at 269-72.
36. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5021-.5042.
37: See id.
38. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (West 1982); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, para.
209(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); see also Saunders, supra note 7, at 274.
39. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.535(c) (1983) (30 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, para.
209(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (60 days).
40. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5040-5060.
41. See id. § 600.5041(7).
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arbitration clause in their contracts for medical services or admission.4 ' The
Michigan statute also requires that such clauses be printed in 12-point type and
include a statement informing the patient that "[t]his agreement to arbitrate is not
a prerequisite to health care or treatment and may be revoked within 60 days after
execution by notification in writing. 
43
C. The Courts' Response
Because labor and commercial contracts have contained binding arbitration
clauses for many years, a substantial amount of general precedent on the legality
of arbitration clauses exists.' However, the use of arbitration clauses in
medical service contracts presents a new legal situation with which a court must
contend. The legal relationship between provider and patient is a hybrid of both
private contract law and public tort law.4 5 This hybrid nature creates a tension
between the precedential acceptance of arbitration in contract cases and a general
premise that tort law exists to force a general conformity with standards of care
demanded by society, especially for members of a profession.4 ' This tension
creates variations by the courts in enforcement of arbitration clauses in medical
service contracts that would otherwise not occur in the enforcement of the same
clause in a commercial or labor contract.47 The courts' response to arbitration
clauses in medical service contracts have not consistently mirrored precedent
established by decisions on arbitration clauses in labor or commercial
contracts.48
The courts' role in enforcing contractual arbitration comes in two
chronological stages; the first occurs before arbitration takes place. In the first
stage, the court decides whether the contract is valid and whether the dispute must
be resolved through arbitration;49 in the second, the court reviews the decision
of the arbitrator. 5' The courts are much more active in the first phase.5
42. Id. § 600.5041(6).
43. Id. § 600.5041(5).
44. See generally RiSKIN AND WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 250-67.
45. See P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/TortBoundary, 49 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 287, 288-91.
46. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 148-56.
47. See Terry, supra note 3, at 572.
48. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 306-22; Terry, supra note 3, at 585-88.
49. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 280-83.
50. See Dickinson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 169 Cal. Rptr. 493, 494 (Ct. App. 1980).
51. More case law exists concerning issues of enforceability. Courts generally give great
deference to an arbitrator's decision. See Sobol v. Hertz Warner, 469 F.2d 1211, 1213-15 (2d Cir.
1972). But see Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 389 N.E.2d 456, 457-60 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing the types of
arbitration decisions which a court may overturn on public policy grounds).
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1. Pre-Arbitration Responses
When contracts redistribute risks which, within a societal context, have
already been distributed in large part by tort law standards, it is perceived that the
courts themselves are reticent to enforce such contracts." An example is a
contract between a doctor and patient containing an exculpatory clause eliminating
all liability of the doctor for any malpractice that might occur.53 In one case
involving such a contract, a court found such a contract invalid because of the
societal notion that the doctor owes the patient some degree of duty of care which
is absolute within their relationship regardless of any private agreements between
the two individuals.' Enforcement of such a contract, therefore, seems to be
contrary to public policy.55
Traditionally, the determination of acceptable standards of medical care and
the compensation of victims of malpractice has been allocated to the tort law
system.56 Arbitration agreements change the forum and the decision-maker for
these determinations; through the use of a medical service contract, public tort
law becomes private tort determinations. Contract law then becomes the focus
of the court's analysis instead of the tort considerations of breach of duty and
compensation for injury.5"
Arbitration, prior to the medical malpractice crises, had been used
predominately in the labor and commercial fields. " Arbitration agreements
reached within these two arenas were generally analyzed by the courts under a
traditional contract approach. 9 However, disputes arising under medical service
contracts and those arising under labor or commercial transaction contracts differ
considerably: The dispute in a medical service contract concerns negligence in
the form of malpractice, whereas in commercial contracts the dispute concerns
non-compliance of terms. The legal system deals differently with the
relationships between people within a negligence dispute and those within a non-
compliance of a contract dispute. Within a contract dispute, the court looks to the
explicit language of the terms upon which the parties agreed, the capacity of the
parties to contract, the extent of the relationship per the subject agreement, and
the actions for which each party is responsible and any resulting non-
compliance.' In a tort dispute, the court, and often the jury, does not decide
a case based upon the relationship created explicitly by the parties but instead on
the duties society imposes upon their relationship.6
52. See Atiyah, supra note 45, at 298-301.
53. See Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903, 903-04 (Ga. 1981).
54. See id. at 905.
55. See id.; see also Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 253-55.
56. See Terry, supra note 3, at 590-93.
57. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 280-83.
58. See generally RiSKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 250-67.
59. Id. at 273-75.
60. See Terry, supra note 3, at 589-90.
61. Id. at 590-91.
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Because of this distinction between the underlying disputes, there is some
substance to the policy argument that contractual agreements are not suitable
vehicles for eliminating tort liability.62 Numerous state courts have refused to
enforce exculpatory clauses in contracts for medical services. In Emory
University v. Porubiansky,63 a case illustrative of courts' hostility to contractual
escapes of tort liability, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to enforce an
exculpatory clause that eliminated liability of a dental clinic after a woman
suffered a broken jaw from treatment for an impacted tooth.' The Georgia
Supreme Court held that enforcement of the exculpatory clause in the medical
service contract would be against public policy because the state imposed a duty
on professionals, specifically those practicing in the medical field, to perform
within certain standards.65 The court concluded that the professional should not
be allowed to relieve herself of that duty.66  Generally, courts will refuse to
enforce similar clauses because they may substantially or completely shift all risk
to the patient.67
In arbitration clauses, however, the change is not necessarily a shift in the
risk but, instead, a change of the forum for the resolution of a possible claim.6"
Additionally, medical care has been traditionally grounded in contracts for
services, although the duties of care prescribed have been established through the
tort system.69 Perhaps because of the strength of having a signed contract before
it as well as the strength of ample precedent upholding arbitration clauses in the
labor and commercial arenas, a court will generally order arbitration in many
malpractice cases when there is an arbitration agreement between the parties.7"
When the courts have restricted or invalidated arbitration agreements for
medical malpractice claims, they generally base their holdings on numerous legal
theories. 7 The most common of these are: 1) constitutionality; 2) deficiencies
in statutory requirements for arbitration agreements; and 3) contractual
challenges, such as holding the agreement unconscionable or holding that the
dispute is outside the scope of the agreement.
a. Constitutionality
The United States Constitution and all but two states' constitutions provide
a right of access to the court system for the redress of injuries and a right to a
62. Id.
63. 282 S.E.2d 903.
64. Id. at 903-04.
65. Id. at 905.
66. Id. at 906.
67. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 164.
68. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 248.
69. See Atiyah, supra note 45, at 292.
70. There are no statistical studies on the number of cases. See PEGALIS & WACHSMAN, supra
note 5, at 15.
71. See Terry, supra note 3, at 588-612.
1992]
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trial by jury in civil suits allowing for damages. 2  An injury for medical
malpractice, whether it proceeds under tort or contract theory, is compensated in
court by a monetary damage award.
The constitutionality of arbitration agreements has been challenged on
numerous grounds including a violation of the right of access to the courts,73 the
right to an impartial decision-maker,74 and a right to a jury trial.75 One recent
example is found in University of Miami v. Echarte.76 In Echarte, the Florida
Court of Appeals held that Section 766.20777 of the Florida statutes was
unconstitutional. 7' The statute provided a method for the parties to agree to a
voluntary, binding, post-occurrence arbitration agreement to resolve medical
negligence claims. 79 The court based its holding upon the Florida constitution's
right of access to the courts provision.8" Another constitutional issue is the
procedural due process right to an impartial decision-maker. 8 However, the
courts have generally rejected this argument, finding that the interest of
arbitrators, even if they are healthcare professionals, is too attenuated to cause a
direct conflict or bias.'
Even though the federal and state constitutions protect the rights of
individuals, an individual may waive a constitutional right;83 contracting to use
binding arbitration would be a waiver of the right to a trial by jury. Valid waiver
of a constitutional right is not readily accepted by the courts; the U.S. Supreme
Court has even held, in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy," that the courts should
"indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver."85
The courts will accept a waiver of constitutional rights when the agreement
to do so is voluntary, such as in the case of contractual binding arbitration
72. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The two states without such constitutional rights are Colorado and
Louisiana. In addition, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has no constitutional provision for a right
to a jury trial.
73. See University of Miami v. Echarte, 585 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).
74. Saunders, supra note 7, at 273.
75. Id.
76. 585 So. 2d 293. The plaintiff in the case was treated for a brain tumor by the University
hospital. Id. at 295. As a result of alleged malpractice, her right arm and hand were amputated. Id..
77. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207 (Supp. 1988).
78. Echarte, 585 So. 2d at 296.
79. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.207(3). The statute was enacted by the Florida legislature in response
to a report concerning the medical malpractice crisis in Florida drafted by the Academic Task Force
for Review of Insurance and Tort Systems. Echarte, 585 So. 2d at 296.
80. Echarte, 585 So. 2d at 296.
81. Saunders, supra note 7, at 276.
82. See Vincent v. Romagosa, 425 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (La. 1983); Morris v. Metriyakool, 344
N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. 1984); Parker v. Childrens' Hosp., 394 A.2d 932, 944 (Pa. 1978); see also
Terry, supra note 3, at 595.
83. Saunders, supra note 7, at 269-72.
84. 301 U.S. 389 (1937). In this case, the Court addressed a waiver of due process rights. Id.
at 393. The Court has also applied this standard to waiver of constitutional rights within the criminal
law context. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).
85. Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393.
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agreements86 where the voluntary nature of such agreements may be at issue.
In circumstances surrounding medical service contracts with hospitals, a patient's
voluntary acceptance of the terms may truly be in question because of the unequal
bargaining power surrounding an agreement for medical care, especially if there
is only one hospital in town. Some states, specifically Michigan and California,
have dispensed with the need for express proof of waiver in arbitration
agreements.' Instead, these jurisdictions apply the traditional presumption that
one who signs a written agreement is presumed to understand it and act
voluntarily.88 On the other hand, some states require that the medical service
contract contain a statement that the agreement is a voluntary waiver of
constitutional rights.89
b. Statutory Deficiencies
Many states have statutes regulating the use of private contractual
arbitration,' some of which are specifically directed at the use of arbitration in
medical service contracts. 91 These statutes govern the language and form that
must be used in arbitration agreements.' Non-compliance with the statutes'
terms provides grounds on which the courts can circumvent an order to arbitrate.
Under various statutes, the arbitration agreement must be printed in a larger type
size, must include an option to rescind that part of the contract within a specific
time, or must include an express statement that signing the agreement constitutes
a waiver of a constitutional right.93
However, court interpretation of when an arbitration clause is in compliance
varies. The Michigan courts, in interpreting the Michigan Medical Malpractice
Arbitration Act,94 are inconsistent in their holdings on the need for exact
compliance with the statute. An example of the inconsistency appears when
comparing the cases of Haywood v. Fowler9 5 and McKain v. Moore.96 In
Haywood, the court ordered arbitration even though the size of the print was
smaller than mandated in the statute.97 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that
86. See Terry, supra note 3, at 593-98.
87. See Morris, 344 N.W.2d at 741; Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1187
(Cal. 1976).
88. See Morris, 344 N.W.2d at 742; Madden, 552 P.2d at 1187-88.
89. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
90. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 268.
91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065; see also Saunders, supra note 7,
at 268 nn.7-8.
93. See, e.g., id. §§ 600.5041-.5042.
94. Id. §§ 600.5040-.5065.
95. 475 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
96. 431 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Haywood, 475 N.W.2d at 460.
1992]
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even though the print size was not that mandated in the statue, it was larger than
the rest of the print and, therefore, was sufficient.98
In McKain, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that strict
compliance with the statute is necessary in order for the arbitration agreement to
be enforceable in court. 99 Here, the court held that the arbitration agreement
had not been executed in strict compliance with the Michigan statute; because
there was conflicting evidence as to what the patient understood to be the
agreement, the court refused to compel arbitration.1°° Such inconsistency in
enforcement of exact compliance leads to much pre-arbitration litigation. This
inconsistency provides for some escape from routine court orders compelling
arbitration.
c. Contractual Challenges
A court must find that a valid contract exists in order to compel arbitration
for the resolution of a dispute.'' One way for a court to avoid an order
compelling arbitration is to find either that the contract as a whole or the
arbitration clause itself is invalid.
The issue of which forum decides the validity - the court or the arbitrator
- must be resolved first."°  As a general rule, federal courts will refuse to
adjudicate issues of contract validity when a valid arbitration clause is found
within the contract itself.0 3 In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., ° the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that even in cases
where the issue is fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole, the
arbitrator holds the authority to decide that issue.'0 5 The Court continued that
courts only have authority to adjudicate claims that the arbitration clause was
fraudulent; all other claims of contract validity are to be decided by the
arbitrator.'0 6 This logic appears to leave federal courts very little room to
maneuver around arbitration clauses.
98. Id.
99. McKain, 431 N.W.2d at 476.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., id. at 475; Horn v. Cooke, 325 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
102. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
103. See AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-85 (1960); see also Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
104. 388 U.S. 395.
105. Id. at 404 (Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §4, "does not permit the
federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.").
106. See id. at 403-04. This case adopted the concept of severability of arbitration clauses from
the rest of the contract. See id. at 402-04. In this way, even if the arbitrator finds the contract as a
whole is invalid, the authority to decide the issue still stands.
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While most state courts that have faced the issue after Prima Paint have
followed the severability approach, some states courts have refused. 07 Even
in jurisdictions where the courts have affirmed the authority of the arbitrator to
decide some issues of contract validity, they have retained the authority of the
courts to decide other issues of contract validity.108
Many states routinely decide the contract validity issues before ordering
arbitration. Two predominant defenses that create loopholes for the enforcement
of arbitration clauses are an allegation that the contract is one of adhesion or an
allegation that the contract is unconscionable. Generally, a contract is found to
be unconscionable where there is disparity between the parties' bargaining power
and the result benefits the stronger party0 9 or when the contract terms are
against public policy."0 A contract of adhesion is one where (1) there exists
an unequal bargaining power, (2) the stronger party offers only pre-set terms, and
(3) no bargaining for the desired services occurs."' The weaker party must
accept the pre-set terms or go without the desired services or product."'
Although contracts of adhesion are not necessarily invalid, they may be deemed
unconscionable or the court may find the terms are beyond the reasonable
expectations of an ordinary person. " '
Although courts generally favor arbitration agreements,"' when the
arbitration agreement falls within a contract for medical services, a court may
look to the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement." 5
Contracts for medical services are highly susceptible to being defined as contracts
of adhesion because persons in need of medical care are often not in a position
of equal bargaining power. In Ramirez v. Superior Court, Santa Clara
County," 6 the California Court of Appeals remanded a case to the trial court
because the trial court "did not resolve the factual issues of coercion" and of
whether Ms. Ramirez understood or reasonably should have understood the
contract." 7 The court's reasoning rested on whether or not the patient felt
compelled to sign the agreement in order to receive treatment."' Whether or
not the patient was aware of the arbitration agreement in a standardized form is
107. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 267.
108. See, e.g., Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 174 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 1961). The issues which the
Exercycle court retained for its own were: (1) voidablity of the contract through fraud or duress
against one of the parties; (2) the frivolous nature of the claim; (3) illegality of performance; and (4)
whether a condition precedent to arbitration was fulfilled. Id. at 334-35.
109. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 280.
110. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 5.1 - 5.9 (1982) (emphasis added).
111. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 40 (defining "adhesion contract").
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Saunders, supra note 7, at 281.
115. Id. at 282-83.
116. 163 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Ct. App. 1980).
117. Id. at 229-30.
118. Id. at 227-29.
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an additional issue in deciding if the agreement is one of adhesion. This second
issue is especially important for hospital admissions forms.'19 Courts, in
dealing with contracts for medical services, may use these arguments to advance
any underlying concepts that malpractice claims should be heard in a court and
not by an informal process like arbitration.'
21
Courts also limit the scope of arbitration clauses, thereby limiting the
number of disputes that must be resolved through arbitration. The Haywood court
held that the arbitration agreement there only covered the patient's first visit to
the hospital and not any subsequent visits, even if they were related to the same
treatment because there was not a signed agreement for each subsequent visit.'21
The scope of coverage of the arbitration agreement is also at issue when
included in group health plan agreements, such as HMOs. In this type of setting,
treatment is provided under an insurance-type agreement. When this agreement
is provided through an employee coverage plan, the argument is asserted that only
the employee-signatory to the coverage plan should be forced to arbitrate and
other family members covered should not be forced to arbitrate. 22 Courts have
generally rejected this argument for derivative claims such as loss of consortium
and for infants covered by the parents' insurance plan. In Leong v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,'23 the court held that the infant could not circumvent the
arbitration agreement because his parents had chosen to accept the medical
treatment that was offered. 24
2. Post-Arbitration Review
The extent of review of arbitrators' decisions vary with the jurisdiction. In
federal courts, the standard of review is governed by the holdings of Sobel v.
Hertz Warner C0.125 and Wilko v. Swan.'26 The general standard of review
is to assess the arbitrator's decision only as to whether it manifestly disregards the
law. 127 This is a rather strict standard and generally precludes any analysis of
the justice of a particular result.
State courts also tend to give great deference to the arbitrator's decision. In
Schneider v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,"28 the California Court of Appeals
corrected an arbitration award to a value larger than the statutory limit on
119. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 785 (Ct. App. 1976); see also
Sanchez v. Sirmons, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
120. See Ginsburg et. al., supra note 12, at 253-55.
121. Haywood, 475 N.W.2d at 458.
122. See, e.g., Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d. 164, 169 (Hawaii 1990).
123. 788 P.2d 164.
124. Id. at 169.
125. 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
126. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
127. Id. at 436.
128. 264 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Ct. App. 1989).
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malpractice damages. 129  However, a state court can refuse to enforce the
decision to arbitrate, often basing its refusal on public policy."S If the result
of the decision would offend the court, it may rely on this doctrine. This
provides another outlet for the courts to provide an escape from arbitration.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Post-Arbitration Review
Arbitration agreements in medical service contracts are predominately
litigated at the pre-arbitration hearing stage. When asked to determine the validity
and scope of these agreements, courts respond in a variety of ways. Often the
agreement is found valid, and the parties are forced to arbitrate their dispute. 3'
However, such enforcement of arbitration clauses in medical service contracts is
inconsistent; often, courts will use a contract theory defense or find
noncompliance with the pertinent state statute in order to refuse to order the
parties to arbitrate. This inconsistency leads to a great deal of pre-arbitration
litigation.
This pre-arbitration litigation defeats much of the purpose for installing
arbitration clauses in these medical service contracts. The parties spend much
time and money pursuing their claim of validity or invalidity, and the courts often
respond not with clear rules but instead with a myriad of exceptions and loopholes
to enforceability. This creates much uncertainty in the enforceability of the
agreements and, therefore, additional litigation. This has an added disadvantage
of clogging the courts' dockets.
Much of this confusion seems to occur because of the hybrid nature of
medical care. Tort influences such as general public safety, acceptable standards
of care, and a desire to compensate true victims for their injuries stand on one
side while the contract influences of freedom to contract and predictability stand
on the other. In the middle is a general uneasiness about the national cost of
healthcare and skyrocketing insurance costs. 13 2
It appears that when the courts invalidate an arbitration clause, they do so
not out of a concern over an invalid contract but out of a fear that arbitration is
not the best choice of forum for medical malpractice claims. A court's true
motivation for refusing to order arbitration may come not from some invalid
contract consideration but instead from an underlying sense of concern for a
consistent standard of care in medical care or simply as a response to an affront
on the court's public tort jurisdiction."'
129. Id. at 237.
130. For an example of such refusal, see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
131. See Terry, supra note 3, at 586.
132. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 7, at 268.
133. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 163, 166-68.
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This fear seems to have some merit. Medical malpractice developed within
the distinct area of tort law for good reason. Tort law was created with the hope
of influencing the actions of society."' In the area of healthcare, tort law sets
out to influence the quality of care given and to ensure a minimal standard that
is used by healthcare providers.'35 The influence of the tort system comes from
monetary sanctions1 which create a deterrent effect in a similar fashion to
those created by criminal sanctions. To privatize the process completely, which
occurs in private arbitration, seems to eliminate this deterrent effect.
Yet, as a counter argument, the use of privately contracted arbitration does
have its advantages. Arbitration may be more just than a formal court process.
Because litigation involving a medical malpractice claim entails the use of expert
witnesses, extensive discovery, and documentation, it is very expensive to pursue;
medical malpractice claims having a low dollar amount injury might never be
tried due to the prohibitive costs of the process.'37  Some resolution and
compensation may still be available if the victim has access to arbitration.
Arbitration would provide a forum for malpractice claims too small to pursue in
court. In addition, arbitration generally is less expensive, less time consuming,
and more "user friendly" than the traditional legal process.'38 Victims may be
able to pursue their claims without the aid of a lawyer. This reduces the cost of
the process as a whole and would allow small-claim suits an avenue for
resolution. Often patients subjected to some medical malpractice only want their
costs paid and the doctor or hospital to be sanctioned; arbitration could provide
this objective to these individuals.
Both of these arguments have merit. When courts reluctantly enforce or
completely invalidate an arbitration agreement, they invariably choose one of
these sets of values and advantages over the other. This is not the only option
open to the courts. A suggested response is to exchange the timing of judicial
oversight from the beginning of the arbitration process to the end: Allow the
arbitration hearing to take place, then allow a decision to be rendered. Later, if
the parties are not satisfied with the result, the courts can then step into the
dispute. The difficulty with this approach is the established legal precedent
created from decisions concerning labor and commercial arbitration awards.'39
However, these cases can easily be distinguished because of the strong tort
influence found in medical malpractice cases.
One alternative approach would be to introduce a new standard of review
which gives less deference to the arbitrator. A model from which to draw a
134. See Atiyah, supra note 45, at 292.
135. See Terry, supra note 3, at 624.
136. Id. at 627-28.
137. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 306.
138. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 167.
139. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 21, at 295.
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hybrid standard of review is the approach taken to rulings by administrative
agencies. "40
Private arbitration parallels administrative hearings in a number of ways.
The hearings are less formal, consume less money and time, and often the
decision-maker is knowledgeable about the subject matter of the dispute. The
differences come from their origins and in the scope of review available to the
parties involved.
State courts could develop a new standard of review for medical malpractice
arbitration cases based on precedent available from judicial review of
administrative decisions. Options would include de novo review, substantial
evidence review, or even substituted judgment. Another alternative would be
simply to use the appellate review standards; this may entail deputizing the
arbitration hearing process as a type of associate or inferior trial court.
The advantages to shifting the courts' involvement in arbitration agreements
to the post-arbitration stage are numerous. First, the parties may actually be
satisfied by the arbitration decision and never need to darken the courthouse door.
This would achieve the goals driving the use of arbitration (to minimize the
process so as to preserve money and time, to reduce court dockets, and to provide
a process that is satisfying to the participants).
The amount of pre-arbitration litigation could be reduced by a court's
rejection of the often strained exceptions to an order forcing arbitration. This
would be more acceptable in light of the concept that the award would be
reviewable. In addition, it could influence the arbitrator's use of generally
accepted standards of care. If the arbitrator's decision did not reflect the court
or legislative standard, the court could remand the case. The court process could
establish some type of publication of acceptable arbitration rulings and awards.
This publication could then achieve one of the positive aspects of the tort process,
which is to influence society. In this situation, publication could help inform the
medical community of acceptable standards of care. It would also provide for the
general tort objective of deterrence of the same malpractice. Lastly, the parties
may feel more comfortable choosing arbitrators with an expertise in the healthcare
profession and less compelled to bicker over arbitrators that show a loyalty for
one side over the other if they know the award will be reviewable.
IV. Conclusion
Medical service contracts containing agreements to arbitrate future disputes
cause difficulty for courts because of the tension between contract enforcement
and the development of tort law within the area of medicine as well as the
consistent enforcement of that law. Courts disturbed with restricting the access
to the court system or with the affront to their jurisdiction may find grounds for
invalidating the agreement. Other courts, influenced by the individual right to
140. Worker's Compensation Administrative Hearing Procedures would be one such example.
See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.490 (1986).
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contract and amenable to arbitration as a litigation alternative, order arbitration.
This inconsistency increases pre-arbitration litigation which subsequently defeats
the goal of arbitration, which is generally to avoid the court process.
Because of the unique nature of medical treatment and its contract and tort
characteristics, it may be best to create an area of law dealing with these cases in
a manner which is tailored to this unique nature. One alternative would be for
the courts to accept review of arbitration awards.
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